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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
for personal property tax purposes under W.Va. Code, 11-6-7(e)
[1986].1581
XXIV. PROBATE LAW
A. Construction of Will
Justice McHugh relied upon the decision in Couch v. Eastham1 2 in
deciding the case of Keller v. Keller.'5a The court in Keller held that
[w]hen the will affords no satisfactory clue to the real intentions
of the testator, the court must from necessity resort to legal
presumptions and rules of construction. But such rules yield to the
intention of the testator apparent in the will, and have no
application when the intention thus appears.158
B. Codicil to Will
Justice McHugh determined the effect of a codicil to a will in Bank of
Raleigh v. Thompson.1585 The opinion held that
[a]lthough a testatrix provided in a will for the bequest of the
corpus of the trust to the Kansas City College of Osteopathy, now
the University of Health Sciences, upon the death of the life estate
beneficiaries, language used by the testatrix in a codicil to that
will, "Money that was to be given as stated in the will to the
Kansas City College . . . shall be given to West Virginia
Osteopath shall be the amount of $1,500.00 ... each year to the
college to be used in a scholarship for a worthy student[,]" and
subsequent use of the language, "Money is to be willed to my
sister Macie Teter Williams. . ." evidences the testatrix's intent to
alter the initial bequest in her will by bequeathing a sum sufficient
to generate $1500 annually to the West Virginia School of
Osteopathic Medicine for scholarship purposes while providing a
residuary bequest of the corpus of the trust to the named
beneficiary, Macie Teter Williams. 1586
1581 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (alterations in original).
1582 3 S.E. 23 (W. Va. 1987).
1583 287 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1982).
1584 Id. at Syl.
1585 351 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1986).
1586 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alterations in original).
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C. Joint Will
Justice McHugh addressed several issues involving a joint will in the case
of Black v. Black.l57 The court initially addressed the status of real property left to
beneficiaries of the joint will. Justice McHugh wrote that
[w]here in a joint will dated August 11, 1969, three testators left
all their property, both real and personal, to the two surviving
testators and then to the last surviving testator, and the will further
provided that upon the death of the last surviving testator the
property "then remaining" would become the property "in fee"
of certain named nieces and nephews, the last surviving testator
received under the will a life estate in the property, and the named
nieces and nephews received a remainder in fee simple. 5 '
The next issue in Black involved the effect of a provision in the joint will
on property previously disposed of under a written agreement. Justice McHugh
held that
[a] written agreement dated January 3, 1950, whereby three parties
expressed an intent that certain real and personal property owned
by them be held jointly with survivorship, was superseded by a
joint will of the parties dated August 11, 1969, where two of the
parties died and the joint will was probated as to them and the last
surviving party accepted benefits under the joint will and where
the disposition of property under the joint will was inconsistent
with the 1950 agreement of the parties concerning the property in
question.""
Justice McHugh determined the rights of a survivor to a joint will in Seifert
v. Sanders.590 The court held that
[w]here in a joint and mutual will persons devised all their real
and personal property to the survivor of them to take and hold as
his or her sole and entire property and vested in the survivor the
power to dispose of the same and the will further provided that at
the death of the survivor, the property "which shall not have been
disposed of" would become, in equal shares, the property of
certain named children and grandchildren, the survivor received a
fee simple estate in the property and the power to dispose
1587 298 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1982).
1588 Id at Syl. PtL.
1589 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
1590 358 S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 1987).
Special]
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absolutely of such property.159'
D. Drafting Will
Justice McHugh held in Brammer v. Taylor 5 92 that "[d]rafting a will for
another person, advising another person how to draft a will or supervising its
execution are activities which constitute the practice of law."',
593
E. Matters Disposable by Will
In Seifert v. Sanders, 594 Justice McHugh held that "[d]epending upon the
language used in an instrument by a grantor of a power to dispose of real and
personal property, that power may be executed not only by a conveyance inter
vivos, but that power may also be executed by will.'
1595
F. Quarantine
The issue of quarantine was addressed by Justice McHugh in Cutone v.
Cutone.1596 Quarantine is the right of a surviving spouse to occupy and enjoy his or
her former marital residence, or mansion house, until such time as dower is
formally assigned. The court in Cutone held that
[a]bandonment of the legal right of quarantine should be deemed
to occur only where: (1) A person entitled to the right of
quarantine has actually abandoned possession of the property
subject to the right; (2) Prior to, or at the time of, abandoning the
possession of the property the person knew of the existence of his
right of quarantine; (3) After abandoning possession of the
property the person entitled to quarantine has demonstrated a lack
of intention to repossess it; and (4) The person entitled to
quarantine has demonstrated an apparent indifference to what
would become of the property.
1597
1591 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1592 338 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1985).
1593 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1594 358 S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 1987).
1595 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1596 285 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 1982).
1597 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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G. Heirs
Relying in part on Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Singer,1598
Justice McHugh held in First Nat. Bank in Fairmont v. Phillips'599 that
[t]he doctrine of equitable adoption is hereby incorporated into the
law of West Virginia, but a litigant seeking to avail himself of the
doctrine in a dispute among private parties concerning trusts or the
descent of property at death must prove by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that he has stood from an age of tender years
in a position exactly equivalent to that of a formally adopted or
natural child[. 1600
The court also said in Phillips that
[i]f an equitable adoption is established by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence, the equitably adopted child would inherit
from another child of the adoptive parent under W.Va. Code,
48-4-11(b) [1984], which provides that an adopted child inherits
"from ... the lineal... kindred of such adopting parent or parents
in the same manner and to the same extent as though said adopted
child were a natural child of such adopting parent or parents."16
H. Fees and Commissions
The decision in Black v. Black60 2 required Justice McHugh to examine the
propriety of an attorney recovering legal fees and a commission as executor or
administrator of a decedent's estate. Justice McHugh said:
In the case of a decedent's estate, this Court does not look with
favor upon the charging of compensation for legal services in
addition to a commission by an attorney who is the executor or
administrator of that estate. Where the executor or administrator
of a decedent's estate is an attorney, compensation for legal
services in addition to a commission may only be allowed within
carefully circumscribed bounds and upon exceptional
circumstances. The burden is upon the attorney to establish those
1598 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).
1599 344 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1985).
1600 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (alteration in original).
1601 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alterations in original).
1602 298 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1982).
Special]
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 28
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol102/iss5/28
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
exceptional circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. 160 3
I. Inheritance Tax
Justice McHugh stated in First National Bank of Morgantown v. McGil11604
that "[tihe former West Virginia inheritance tax is ultimately the responsibility of
the recipient of the specific property, unless the testator or testatrix clearly and
specifically expresses otherwise in the will." 1605 The opinion also indicated:
A clause in a will which contains a general direction to the
personal representative to pay debts, expenses and taxes, or
similar "stock" language, is not sufficient by itself to shift the
liability for the former West Virginia inheritance tax from the
specific devisees or legatees to the residuary estate. 160 6
J. Gift Causa Mortis
Justice McHugh addressed an issue involving a gift causa mortis in the
case of Lutz v. Orinick.160 7 The court held:
A party seeking to prove fraud, mistake or other equally serious
fault must do so by clear and convincing evidence and if such
fraud, mistake or other equally serious fault is not so proven, then
the surviving joint tenant may rely on the conclusive presumption
created by W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33, as amended, that the donor
depositor of a joint and survivorship account intended a causa
mortis gift of the proceeds remaining in the account after his death
to the surviving joint tenant to establish such gift.1608
K. Notifying Beneficiaries of Will
Justice McHugh discussed the role of the county clerk to notify
beneficiaries of a will in the case of Cary v. Riss.160 9 Justice McHugh held:
Upon delivery of any will to the county clerk, the county clerk is
required under the provisions of W.Va. Code, o41-5-2 [1931] to
1603 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
1604 377 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1988).
1605 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1606 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1607 401 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1990).
1608 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1609 433 S.E.2d 546 (W. Va. 1993).
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notify by mail or otherwise the beneficiaries named under the will.
Notification "by mail or otherwise" shall be construed as certain
to ensure actual notice. Upon receiving such actual notice,
constitutional due process requirements are satisfied because
beneficiaries have notice that the testator has died and that probate
proceedings will be instituted. Neither due process nor any
statutory provision requires that the beneficiaries must also be
given actual notice of the county commission's refusal to probate
the will under W.Va. Code, 41-5-10 [1923.11 °
L. Effects of Divorce on Will
The case of Foy v. County Commission of Berkeley County611 involved
interpretation of two statutes addressing the effects of a divorce on a will. Justice
McHugh held initially that
W.Va. Code, 41-1-6 [1975], provided, in part that, "[e]very will
made by a man or woman shall be revoked by his or her marriage,
annulment or divorce, except a will which makes provision therein
for such contingency[." The amendments to W.Va. Code, 41-1-6
[Supp.1992], effective after June 5, 1992, provide that, "[i]f after
executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage annulled,
the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment
of property made by the will to the former spouse, .. .. unless the
will expressly provides otherwise." The primary difference
between the 1975 version of the statute and the 1992 version of
the statute is that the former, with certain exceptions, essentially
revokes the entire will by marriage, divorce or annulment. The
amended version only revokes the disposition of the property
made by the will to the former spouse upon divorce or annulment.
Marriage no longer revokes a will.
1612
The opinion concluded:
When a decedent executed a will in 1986, married in 1990, and
died in 1992, the will was revoked pursuant to W.Va. Code,
41-1-6 [1975], which provides that a subsequent marriage revokes
a will. The will was not revived because it was not re-executed
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 41-1-8 [1923], which requires that a will
1610 Id. at Syl.
1611 442 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1994).
1612 Id. at Syl. Pt 2 (alterations in original).
Special]
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be re-executed in order for it to be revived.
1 613
M. Effects of Marriage on Premarital Will
Justice McHugh stated in Mongold v. Mayle,' 614 that "[e]ven though a
testator executed a premarital will, as provided by W.Va. Code, 42-3-7 [1992], a
surviving spouse of that testator is not precluded from taking an elective share of
the decedent spouse's estate pursuant to W.Va. Code, 42-3-1 [1992]." 1615
XXV. BusINEss LAW
A. Shareholders
Relying in part on Southern Electrical Supply Co. v. Raleigh County
National Bank, 616 Justice McHugh held in Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc.1617 that "[tihe
law presumes.., that corporations are separate from their shareholders.' ' 618
B. Partnership
In Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. v. Blueville Bank of
Grafton,161 9 Justice McHugh addressed several matters pertaining to partnerships.
The court initially stated:
W. Va. Code, 47-8-2 [1986], which provides that no general
partnership may carry on business in this state under any assumed
name other than the names of the individuals owning the business
unless those persons file in the office of the clerk of the county
commission certain information, is to be construed in pari materia
with W. Va. Code, 46-9-402(7) [1974], which specifies that it is
sufficient to put the individual, partnership, or corporate names of
the debtors on a financing statement whether or not it adds other
trade names of the parties.162 °
The court next held:
1613 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
1614 452 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1994).
1615 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1616 320 S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1984).
1617 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
1618 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1619 (W. Va. 1993).
1620 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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